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Abstract
First year students at the Pontiﬁcia Universidad Católica de Chile, one of the leading Chilean universities,
are randomly assigned to their ﬁrst semester college class groups. This paper takes advantage of this natural
experiment in order to robustly estimate the impact of peer characteristics on undergraduate academic
performance. The research hypothesis is that being assigned as a freshman to a group with more or less
students from a same school, or from a given socioeconomic background, may result in very diﬀerent patterns
of adaptation, potentially impacting academic performance. This paper ﬁnds evidence which suggests that,
contrary to the results found in most of the existing literature, the average college admission score of ﬁrst
semester classmates not only has no positive impact on the academic performance of undergraduate students,
but may actually be negatively aﬀecting their grades. Also, although there are some diﬀerences across degrees
and secondary school types, in general undergraduate students are more likely to be dismissed, and have lower
grades, when they share their ﬁrst semester college class with a secondary schoolmate. Moreover, students
assigned to ﬁrst semester college classrooms with a higher concentration of classmates who attended the same
secondary school(s) generally have signiﬁcantly lower grades, and are less likely to graduate. Finally, students
sharing their ﬁrst semester college classroom with students from public or subsidized secondary schools are
more likely to be dismissed due to poor academic performance. The fact that these peer eﬀects are persistent
in time points to the existence of a path dependence pattern, suggesting that this initial period in college
is key for student adaptation. These ﬁndings have important implications for the design of policies intended
to improve the adaptation of freshman college students and the access to higher education, suggesting that
students would beneﬁt from targeted ﬁrst semester college class group assignment policies, as well as from
additional transitional aid tailored to their proﬁles.
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of its author, and do not necessarily represent the
views of, and should not be attributed to, any other individual or institution.
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1. Introduction
The interaction among peers is a very diﬃcult subject to study, given its complexity and the fact that
peer group formation is usually endogenous (e.g. individuals self-select into peer groups, or are assigned to
them according to observable characteristics). Therefore, natural experiments in which students have been
randomly assigned to their peer groups provide a unique opportunity to exploit exogenous group formation,
allowing to robustly estimate peer eﬀects1. For example, in his seminal paper Sacerdote (2001) uses random
assignment of college roommates to evaluate the impact of room sharing on grades and socialization patterns.
This has spurred a series of related papers which also take advantage of natural experiments2, but these
generally focus on non-academic dimensions and non-classroom interactions, so that there is ample scope to
improve our understanding of the impact of college peers on undergraduate academic performance.
Chile, albeit a middle-income country and an OECD member, faces substantial gaps in the provision of
higher education. For example, while the OECD average net coverage of higher education (i.e. the ratio of
students 18-24 years old enrolled in higher education) is 59%, the net coverage of higher education in Chile is
36.3%, and the net coverage for the poorest decile of the population is 16.4% (OECD, 2011). Moreover, poor
students usually attend public or subsidized secondary schools, while rich students usually attend private
schools of higher quality. Only 10% of public school graduates attend elite universities, versus 31% for
private schools, resulting in a clear majority of private school students in those institutions. Then, it is not
surprising that the access to higher education is currently one of the most important issues for Chilean society
(see for example Loofbourow, 2013), and the main reason behind the notorious student protests which have
taken place there during the last years. Therefore, there is an ongoing debate both at the government and
university levels regarding which is the best way to increase the access to higher education, and to ensure
equality of opportunity for all.
In view of all of the above, this paper takes advantage of a natural experiment in Chile in order to estimate
the impact of college peers on academic performance. In particular, it exploits the random assignment of
ﬁrst year students to their ﬁrst semester college class groups at the Pontiﬁcia Universidad Católica de
1For alternative methodologies see for example: Manresa (2013), who discusses in depth the estimation of social interactions
using panel data; De Giorgi et al (2010) who discuss the identiﬁcation of social interactions through partially overlapping peer
groups; Bramoullé et al (2009) or Boucher et al (2014), who estimate a linear-in-mean model of secondary school students in
the context of recreational services consumption and student achievement, respectively; or Calvo-Armengol et al (2009) and
Patacchini et al (2011), who develop and estimate models to study the impact of adolescent friendship networks on school
performance and educational attainment, respectively.
2See for example: Boisjoly et al (2006), who study the impact of random ﬁrst year roommate assignment on attitudes towards
other ethnic groups; Burns et al (2013), who take advantage of random assignment of peers at one of the leading South African
universities to also study racial relations; or Kremer and Levy (2008), who use the same strategy of random assignment of
roommates to study the impact of peers on alcohol use among college students.
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Chile, one of the leading Chilean universities. It relies on anonymous administrative data, collected by the
university on a regular basis for academic and administrative purposes. The analysis includes all students
who entered the Engineering and Commercial Engineering3 degrees via ordinary admission between 2000
and 2006. These students are randomly assigned to ﬁrst semester groups of 40-60 students, with whom they
share the classroom when taking core non-elective courses (which make up the majority of the ﬁrst semester
curriculum). The research hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, being assigned as a freshman to a class group
with more or less students from the same school(s) or from a given socioeconomic background may result
in very diﬀerent patterns of adaptation (e.g. determining how the student evolves in the new environment,
or the size and characteristics of the network of college contacts acquired). This idea is similar to Shue
(2013), who taking advantage of the random assignment of students to MBA sections at Harvard Business
School, estimates how executive peer networks can aﬀect managerial decision-making and ﬁrm policies.
However, by focusing on undergraduate degrees instead than on a MBA program, this paper tries to improve
our understanding of college student adaptation in general, and of peer eﬀects on academic performance in
particular. This includes exploring whether causal adaptation mechanisms may rely on diﬀerent socialization
patterns triggered by the heterogeneous composition of ﬁrst semester class groups, in terms of (i) admission
score, (ii) number of students from the same secondary school, (iii) concentration of students from the same
secondary school type4, and (iv) secondary school type. All these dimensions have clear implications for
the design of policies intended to improve the academic performance and adaptation of college students in
general, and of those from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds in particular.
It is not trivial to anticipate, a priori, what should be the impact on undergraduate academic performance of
sharing the classroom with peers who obtained a better admission score. On the one hand, students may be
able to beneﬁt from potential positive learning externalities, but on the other hand it is also conceivable to
think that peers with a better admission score may be more likely to procrastinate (e.g. if they feel that they
can still achieve good grades with reduced eﬀort). However, this paper not only rules out a positive impact
of average college admission score of ﬁrst semester classmates, but ﬁnds evidence of a negative impact on
undergraduate grades (both short, medium and long term). This diﬀers from previous ﬁndings in most of the
literature, suggesting that the above mentioned negative drag eﬀect outweighs potential positive learning
externalities.
Similarly, it is not trivial to anticipate, a priori, what should be the impact on undergraduate academic
performance of sharing the same ﬁrst semester college classroom with secondary schoolmates. On the one
3Note that the Commercial Engineering undergraduate degree oﬀered by Chilean universities usually encompasses the Eco-
nomics and Business undergraduate majors oﬀered by universities in the United States.
4It is an stylized fact of Chilean education that there is a very high correlation between secondary school type and socioeco-
nomic status, as well as between tuition rates and the quality of secondary education. The vast majority of students from the
top quintile of the income distribution attend private secondary schools, while students from the lowest quintiles usually attend
subsidized secondary schools (or if their parents cannot even aﬀord the subsidized tuition, public ones).
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hand, being in a classroom with familiar faces may ease the transition from secondary school to college, but
on the other hand it is also conceivable to imagine that the presence of secondary schoolmates may increase
the temptation to procrastinate, at the expense of academics. This paper ﬁnds that secondary schoolmate
presence in the ﬁrst semester college classroom has a signiﬁcant negative impact on undergraduate academic
performance, both in terms of lower medium and long term grades, and of an increased likelihood of being
dismissed due to poor academic performance. This suggests that the negative eﬀect of a familiar face in the
classroom outweigh its potentially positive ones.
Also, it is not trivial to anticipate what should be, a priori, the impact on academic performance of being
assigned to a ﬁrst semester college classroom with a higher concentration of students from the same secondary
school(s). On the one hand, if a large proportion of students already know each other from secondary school,
others may be shut oﬀ the main social group(s). But on the other hand, new students may ﬁnd it easier
to assimilate into an already structured social group. Moreover, it is not trivial to anticipate how being
left out or assimilated should aﬀect academic performance. Similarly to the case of secondary schoolmate
presence, already discussed above, on the one hand students may beneﬁt from more academic and social
interaction with their college classmates. However, on the other hand this may also increase the opportunities
for procrastination and the time devoted to non-academic activities, at the expense of academic performance.
This paper ﬁnds a persistent and signiﬁcant negative impact of secondary school concentration in the ﬁrst
semester college classroom on both short and long term undergraduate grades, as well as on the likelihood
of dismissal due to poor academic performance. This suggests that having a large proportion of classmates
who attended the same few secondary schools is detrimental to academic performance.
Furthermore, it is again not trivial to anticipate what should be, a priori, the impact on academic performance
of being randomly assigned to a ﬁrst semester college classroom in which there is a larger presence of public
or subsidized secondary school students. On the one hand, as already mentioned above these students, and
particularly the former, usually have had a secondary education of lower quality. They therefore may have
signiﬁcant formative gaps, which may potentially be the cause of negative learning externalities. However,
on the other hand these students have obtained admission to very competitive degrees, despite the fact that
they often faced considerably more diﬃculties than their peers. They therefore may have a comparable,
or even greater, innate ability than their private school counterparts, and/or be more motivated5. This
paper ﬁnds evidence that students assigned to a ﬁrst semester college classroom with a higher percentage
of public or subsidized secondary school students are more likely to be dismissed. However, while there is
some evidence that an increased presence of public school students may, ceteris paribus, result in slightly
lower undergraduate grades for their peers, this paper ﬁnds that an increased presence of subsidized school
5Since students from private secondary schools usually come from the top quintile of the income distribution their outside
option may be much higher than that of public or subsidized school students from lower quintiles, potentially reducing motivation
and eﬀort.
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students may have the opposite eﬀect. This suggests that although positive learning externalities may in
some cases be overshadowed by other factors, they still matter.
Finally, when looking separately at students admitted to each of the two degrees included in the analysis
(Engineering and Commercial Engineering), or when allowing for the coeﬃcients of interest to vary by the
type of secondary school of origin, the results are generally consistent with the main ﬁndings discussed above.
However, although there is evidence of some diﬀerences across students from the two degrees, and across
students from diﬀerent secondary school types, the results are noisier and no robust pattern is observed.
These results are therefore no presented on this paper.6
It is worth noting that the above presented results are generally time-persistent, pointing to the existence of a
path dependence pattern, and suggesting that this initial period in college is key for the student adaptation.
These ﬁndings have important implications for the design of policies intended to improve the adaptation
of freshman college students, and the access to higher education. In particular, they suggest that students
would beneﬁt from targeted ﬁrst semester college class group assignment policies, as well as from additional
transitional aid tailored to their proﬁle.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the motivation and background for the paper;
Section 3 provides a description of the data used in the analysis; Section 4 provides a detailed description
of the research methodology; Section 5 outlines the main ﬁndings; Section 6 discusses the robustness of the
analysis; Section 7 concludes.
2. Motivation
Chile, albeit a middle-income country and a member of the OECD, faces substantial gaps in the provision
of higher education. For example, while the OECD average net coverage of higher education (i.e. the ratio
of students 18-24 years old enrolled in higher education) is 59%, the net coverage of higher education in
6When making cross-degree comparisons it is worth noting that the assignment to each degree is not random, allowing for
self-selection and potentially resulting in very diﬀerent student proﬁles in Engineering and Commercial Engineering. Also, note
that population size problems may be aggravated when looking at each degree separately. This may be the reason why some
signiﬁcant eﬀects are only found on the Engineering subpopulation, since it is much larger than the Commercial Engineering
one. Therefore, this type of diﬀerential impacts across degrees should not be viewed as exceedingly robust. Finally, note also
that the limited number of students from subsidized and public schools results in limited power to detect diﬀerential impacts
by school type, and may potentially be causing near-complete determination problems, as well as increased sensibility of point
estimates to alternative speciﬁcations and estimation methods. However, this is only a concern when looking at the diﬀerential
impact by school type, and in principle should not aﬀect the general results presented in this paper, which are applicable to all
school types.
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Chile is 36.3%, while the net coverage for the poorest decile of the population is 16.4%. Also, students from
low income families usually attend public or subsidized public schools, while students from the top of the
income distribution usually attend private schools featuring higher quality. It is then not surprising that only
10% of public school graduates attend elite universities, versus 31% for private schools, resulting in a clear
majority of private school students in high quality undergraduate institutions. Moreover, lengthy degrees
(lasting 13.6 semesters on average) make education comparatively costly, and there is great variance (3:1
to 5:1) in income among graduates with the same degree (for more details about these stylized facts see
Comisión de Financiamiento Estudiantil para la Educación Superior, 2012).
The university in which this study was carried out, one of the top in the country, is a good example of the
above: 71.7% of students are from households in the upper quintile of the income distribution, versus 3.4%
from its lower quintile. The pattern is even more pronounced in the most prestigious degrees: for example,
ordinary admission into its Commercial Engineering degree usually requires a score of at least 730 points in
the Prueba de Selección Universitaria (PSU), the standardized admission test administered at the national
level. This score corresponds to the 98% percentile of the distribution, so that the overwhelming majority
of the 250 new students admitted each year attended private secondary schools, and belong to households in
the two upper quintiles of the income distribution (see DEMRE, 2011, and Dirección de Servicios Financieros
Estudiantiles, 2011).
Then, it is not surprising that the access to higher education is currently one of the most pressing issues for
Chilean society, and the main reason behind the notorious student protests which have taken place there
during the last years (see for example Loofbourow, 2013). Therefore, there is an ongoing debate at both the
government and university levels regarding which is the best way to increase the access to higher education,
and to ensure equality of opportunity. At its forefront is the role of the PSU, the standardized admissions test,
which some argue that may be discriminating against talented students from poor backgrounds. This is both
because due to its alleged focus on knowledge instead of ability (talented but poor students who attended
public or subsidized secondary schools may have very signiﬁcant knowledge gaps compared to their private
secondary school peers), and to the prevalence of test preparation courses, or preuniversitarios. The latter
are attended by most private school students, but are generally not aﬀordable for poorer students from public
and subsidized secondary schools (for a related study on the subject in Chile see Banerjee et al (2012), who
provide test preparation courses to students from disadvantaged backgrounds, and experimentally evaluate
their impact). Another factor which is generally perceived as an important barrier to access higher education
is its cost, which makes it prohibitive for many households. The Chilean government has been expanding
public funding, but many times this doesn't cover the full tuition fees, and stipends to cover living expenses
are very rare. Moreover, in order to address potential incentive problems, this funding often takes the
shape of loans. However, this may have information and risk aversion implications which are not trivial,
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particularly in a middle- or low- income development country setting, with high uncertainty regarding the
returns to education (see Dinkelman and Martinez, 2011, who using an experimental design evaluate the role
of information about ﬁnancial aid in the access to higher education in Chile; or Hoxby and Turner, 2012,
who also look at the issue in the United States using a randomized control trial).
In order to bypass the potential admission test bias and/or funding problems, in the last few years many
universities have created special admission programs. These are intended to improve the access to under-
graduate education for secondary school students from disadvantaged backgrounds, but their impact is not
yet clear. Moreover, many students admitted via those programs seem prone to experience adaptation pro-
blems, leading to student drop out (anecdotical evidence suggests that similar adaptation problems arise
with ordinary admission students from the lower quintiles of the income distribution). 7. In the United Sta-
tes, Arcidiacono et al (2011) study the on-campus interracial interaction among college students, and ﬁnd
empirical evidence that the probability of interaction between races on a campus is sensitive to the degree
of mismatch between racial groups8. Therefore, it is plausible that the probability of interaction between
students from diﬀerent socioeconomic backgrounds on a campus or degree may also be sensitive to the degree
of mismatch between socioeconomic groups (see for example Rao, 2013, who analyses how mixing students
from diﬀerent socioeconomic backgrounds in Indian schools aﬀects social preferences and behaviors). This
could be aﬀecting the socialization patterns of students from disadvantaged backgrounds, which in turn may
be aﬀecting their adaptation to college.
However, it seems that ordinary admission students from disadvantaged backgrounds who do not drop out
have an academic performance comparable to that of their counterparts, although some may be choosing sof-
ter courses with a more reduced mathematical component. The latter would be consistent with Arcidiacono
et al (2012), who ﬁnd that minority students in at Duke University in the United States catch up with their
majority counterparts in terms of grades, but that this is at the expense of switching to the above mentioned
less quantitative softer courses. Also, existing evidence suggests that there is a very high variance, in terms
of labor market outcomes, across individuals with the same undergraduate education degree (this is often
true even for graduates of the same university). In view of Sacerdote (2001), who using random assignment of
college roommates ﬁnds an impact of room sharing on grades and socialization patterns, it is plausible that
this labor market heterogeneity may at least partly be due not only to peer eﬀects, but also to diﬀerential
socialization patterns. These may lead to diﬀerences in the characteristics of the network of contacts acquired
during college, which in many cases may impact not only undergraduate academic performance, but also
choice of subjects or labor market outcomes after graduation.
7For related research in the U.S. and Canada see, for example, Arcidiacono et al (2011) or Angrist et al (2006).
8See also Burns et al (2013) for an analysis of the relationship between social interaction and racial prejudice in South Africa
using randomly assigned university peers.
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Finally, it is worth noting that the interaction among peers is in general terms a very diﬃcult subject to study.
This is due to its complexity, but also because peer group formation is usually endogenous (e.g. students self-
select into peer groups, or assigned according to observable characteristics). Therefore, natural experiments in
which students have been randomly assigned to their peer groups provide a unique opportunity to estimate
peer eﬀects (for alternative methodologies see for example: Manresa (2013), who discusses in depth the
estimation of social interactions using panel data; De Giorgi et al (2010) who discuss the identiﬁcation of
social interactions through partially overlapping peer groups; Bramoullé et al (2009) or Boucher et al (2014),
who estimate a linear-in-mean model of secondary school students in the context of recreational services
consumption and student achievement, respectively; or Calvo-Armengol et al (2009) and Patacchini et al
(2011), who develop and estimate models to study the impact of adolescent friendship networks on school
performance and educational attainment, respectively). The above mentioned seminal paper by Sacerdote
(2001) has spurred a series of related papers using other natural experiments (see for example: Boisjoly et al
(2006), who study the impact of random ﬁrst year roommate assignment on attitudes towards other ethnic
groups; Burns et al (2013), who take advantage of random assignment of peers at one of the leading South
African universities to also study racial relations; or Kremer and Levy (2008), who use the same strategy
of random assignment of roommates to study the impact of peers on alcohol use among college students).
However, these generally focus on non-academic dimensions and non-classroom interactions, so that there is
ample scope to improve our understanding of the impact of peer eﬀects on academic performance.
In view of all of the above, this paper takes advantage of a natural experiment in Chile in order to estimate
the impact of class composition on academic performance. In particular, it exploits the random assignment
of freshmen to their ﬁrst semester college class groups at the Pontiﬁcia Universidad Católica de Chile, one of
the leading Chilean universities. The research hypothesis is that being assigned as a freshman to a group with
more or less students from the same school(s), or from a given socioeconomic background, may ceteris paribus
result in very diﬀerent patterns of socialization. The latter may determine how the student adapts to the new
environment, as well as the size and characteristics of the network of contacts acquired during college. This
idea is similar to Shue (2013), who in order to estimate how executive peer networks can aﬀect managerial
decision-making and ﬁrm policies, exploits the random assignment of students to MBA sections at Harvard
Business School. However, this paper focuses on college education, instead than on MBA students. By doing
so, it intends to help to improve our understanding of student adaptation mechanisms, and the relationship
between peer characteristics and undergraduate academic performance. In particular, this paper tries to
estimate the impact of being randomly assigned to a ﬁrst semester classgroup with peers which may diﬀer
along several dimensions, i.e. (i) admission score, (ii) presence of secondary schoolmates, (iii) concentration
of students from the same secondary school type, and (iv) presence of public or subsidized secondary school
students (note that it is an stylized fact of Chilean education that there is a very high correlation between
secondary school type and socioeconomic status, and between tuition rates and the quality of secondary
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education; the vast majority of students from the top quintile of the income distribution attend private
secondary schools, while students from the lowest quintiles usually attend subsidized secondary schools, or if
their parents cannot aﬀord even the subsidized tuition, public ones). All of the above have clear implications
for the design of policies intended to improve the adaptation of all college students in general, and of those
from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds in particular.
3. Data
This study relies on anonymous administrative data from undergraduate students, collected by the Pontiﬁcia
Universidad Católica de Chile on a regular basis, for academic and administrative purposes. This includes
standard administrative data required for the admission process (such as secondary education details and
standardized test scores), but also information about socioeconomic status (necessary to determine beneﬁt
eligibility). Moreover, once students are enrolled in the university, their grades, courses taken, class groups
and academic status are all recorded each semester, in order to allow for the eﬀective monitoring of their
progress during their undergraduate studies.
Data is available for all students enrolled in the university from 2000 to 2012.9 However, the analysis is limi-
ted to students admitted from 2000 to 2006, so that a complete record from admission to graduation exists
for all the studied cohorts. Also, the analysis is limited to students enrolled in the Engineering and Commer-
cial Engineering degrees (note that the Commercial Engineering undergraduate degree oﬀered by Chilean
universities usually encompasses the Economics and Business undergraduate majors oﬀered by universities
in the United States). This is because these are among the largest degrees in terms of student enrollment,
but also because other degrees were aﬀected by curricular changes, making it impossible to reliably compare
cohorts across time.10
Students seeking admission to the university must take a standardized test, administered at the national levels
9Records exist before the year 2000. However, due to the use of outdated databases and inconsistent data gathering and
storage protocols, they were not deemed reliable by the university, and were not made available for the purpose of this analysis.
It is also worth noting that, due to the country's location in the Southern hemisphere, the Chilean academic year starts in
March and ends in December.
10Note that ceteris paribus a smaller population size will result in more limited statistical power, i.e. an increase in the
minimum eﬀect size which can be inferred to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In other words, in the absent of suﬃcient
statistical power, if no impact is observed it is impossible to establish whether it is truly non-existent, or whether its size is
simply below the observable threshold. Pooling degrees may alleviate this problem, allowing for increase statistical power, and
pushing the minimum detectable eﬀect threshold upwards. However, this would only allow to estimate aggregate peer eﬀects, as
opposed to degree-speciﬁc. Also, note that even the Engineering and Commercial Engineering degrees have undergone curricular
changes during the period of study. However, those changes were suﬃciently limited so that it still possible to perform a reliable
comparison of cohorts across time.
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to all Chilean students interested in accessing higher education11. This test consists of two compulsory parts
(language and mathematics), and two or more optional ones. Together, they generate a weighted admission
score, which is then used to determine admission in a centralized clearing process performed at the national
level. First, each university decides whether or not to participate in the centralized admission process (the
majority do, and certainly the best regarded ones). If so, it submits the admissions criteria (i.e. weighted
admission score formula) to the centralized authority. Then, after taking the standardized admissions tests,
students are asked to rank their university-degree preferences. Finally, the system clears in several rounds,
by allocating the highest ranked students (in terms of admissions score) to their most preferred choice, and
using ranked waiting lists to resolve conﬂicts (for more details see DEMRE, 2011-2013).
Both the Engineering and the Commercial Engineering degrees at the Pontiﬁcia Universidad Católica de
Chile are highly competitive. Weighted admission scores are invariably very close to the maximum possible
(850 points), with minimum admission scores ranging between 705-710 points, and maximum ones ranging
between 825-830 points. The Engineering degree generally takes 6 years to complete, while the Commercial
Engineering degree usually takes 5 years to complete. There are several ﬁnancial aid options available for
students who qualify, in terms of both socioeconomic and academic criteria. During their secondary schoo-
ling students may have attended a public (fully paid for by the government), subsidized (partly paid for by
the government) or private (paid for in full by the student) school. The quality of secondary education in
subsidized schools is generally lower than in private ones, while the quality of secondary education in public
schools is in turn generally lower than in subsidized ones (note that a few but important exceptions to this
stylized fact exist, most notably the Instituto National or National Institute, an elite secondary school
funded by the government). This, together with the high cost of test preparation courses, results in students
from private secondary schools usually obtaining substantially higher scores in the standardized admission
test. Therefore, the majority of students admitted to the most demanded degrees at elite universities (in-
cluding the two studied in this paper) attended private secondary schools. Moreover, many students who
attended the same secondary school then enroll in the same degree, at the same university, sometimes even
sharing their ﬁrst semester college classroom (for example, the database used for this analysis shows that
some students shared their ﬁrst semester college classroom with up to 8 secondary school classmates).
Table I provides a summary of the number of students by school type in each degree. As observed there, each
year there are usually four ﬁrst semester class groups in the Commercial Engineering degree, and at least
six class groups in the Engineering degree.12 Each ﬁrst semester class group usually features 50-60 students
in the Commercial Engineering degree, and 40-50 students in the Engineering one. Each year between 200
11Note that the standardized admissions test format changed in 2003 from the old PAA (Prueba de Aptitud Académica or
Academic Aptitude Test, to the new PSU (Prueba de Selección Universitaria or University Selection Test.
12Note that the actual group numbers in the Engineering degree are not always correlative. Also, the variation in the number
of groups in the Engineering degree seems to be due to a larger intake of new students via ordinary admission in 2000 and 2006.
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and 250 students are admitted to the Commercial Engineering degree via ordinary admission, while between
250-300 are admitted to the Engineering school.
4. Methodology
This paper takes advantage of the natural experiment created by the random assignment of incoming under-
graduate students to ﬁrst semester class groups at the Pontiﬁcia Universidad Católica de Chile. Freshmen
are ranked according to their weighted admission score, and randomly assigned to one of the ﬁrst semester
class groups (the latter are referred to as secciones, or sections). Students in each of these class groups
share the classroom when attending their ﬁrst semester non-elective core courses. These are the majority
(and many times the only) courses taken by freshmen during their ﬁrst college semester, and students in the
same class group therefore spend most of their ﬁrst semester together. It is then plausible to think that many
newly arrived students form the majority of their college social links during this period, and that assignment
to one class group or another will inﬂuence the social networks of the student during their undergraduate
years (and potentially even after graduation).
Therefore, this random assignment to ﬁrst semester class groups allows to robustly estimate the impact
of peer characteristics on undergraduate academic performance. Linear13 speciﬁcations with ﬁxed eﬀects
and clustered standard errors are used (i.e. the analysis takes into account that there may be correlation
within each class group, and corrects for this fact by clustering at the class group and year level - class
groups are considered distinct across admission years). Academic performance variables of interest include:
(1) Graduation (i.e. whether the student graduated); (2) Drop Out (i.e. whether student decided to abandon
studies); (3) Dismissal (i.e. whether the student was dismissed due to poor academic performance)14; (4)
First Semester GPA (Grade Point Average); (5) First Year GPA; (6) Final Undergraduate GPA.
First, this paper analyzes the impact on the above mentioned outcome variables of secondary schoolmate
presence in a student's ﬁrst semester college class group. For this purpose two linear functional forms are
speciﬁed: a baseline speciﬁcation (which includes only the independent variable of interest and the appropriate
ﬁxed eﬀects), and a extended speciﬁcation (which includes six additional control variables for robustness
purposes). These two linear regression models are respectively represented as
13More sophisticated and non-linear speciﬁcations have also been explored, but the structure of the data is such that, given
the available population size, the simpler linear speciﬁcations already provide limited statistical power. Therefore, more complex
speciﬁcations run into standard small population size problems.
14It is worth noting that a student dropping out is likely to be a proxy for lack of adaptation to the new environment, while a
student being dismissed is likely to be a proxy for gaps in secondary education, particularly in the case of public and subsidized
secondary school students.
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(III.1) yijkl = β0 + δ1mijkl + γjl + µkl + eijkl
(III.2) yijkl = β0 + δ1mijkl +
6∑
h=1
βhxhijkl + γjl + µkl + eijkl
where yijkl is one of the six college academic performance outcome variables described above, and mijkl is
an indicator variable equal to one if student i in ﬁrst semester college class group j shares the classroom
with any other students from their same secondary school k who were also admitted to the same degree
during academic year l15. As mentioned, for robustness purposes six additional student level individual
controls xhijklh = {1, ..., 6)} are introduced in the second speciﬁcation. These are: (i) Gender (1 = Male);
(ii) Weighted Admission Score; (iii) Mother's Educational Level; (iv) Father's Educational Level; (v) Housing
Status (1 = Student lives with both parents); and (vi) Region (1 = Santiago Metropolitan Region). Two sets
of ﬁxed eﬀects are also speciﬁed in the functional form: (a) γjl accounts for any unobservable idiosyncratic
characteristics of ﬁrst semester college class group j in academic year l; (b) µkl is the number of students
from secondary school k admitted in academic year l to the same degree (note that µkl is included in place
of ηkl - i.e. secondary school ﬁxed eﬀects - because, although this also guarantees that mijkl satisﬁes the
standard exogeneity assumption, the number of required ﬁxed eﬀect terms in the speciﬁcation goes down,
increasing the precision of the estimation.). Finally, as already mentioned the analysis takes into account
that there might be correlation across class groups, and corrects for this fact by clustering at the class group
and year level (class groups are considered distinct across admission years).
Secondly, this paper also analyzes the impact on academic performance of the average weighted admission
score of any secondary schoolmates in a student's ﬁrst semester college class group. As before, two linear
functional forms are speciﬁed: a baseline speciﬁcation (which includes only the independent variable of
interest and the appropriate ﬁxed eﬀects), and a extended speciﬁcation (which for robustness purposes
includes six additional control variables). These two linear regression models are respectively represented as
(IV.1) yijkl = β0 + δ
′
1mijkl + δ2sijklmijkl + γjl + ηkl + eijkl
(IV.2) yijkl = β0 + δ
′
1mijkl + δ2sijklmijkl +
6∑
h=1
βhxhijkl + γjl + ηkl + eijkl
where as before yijkl is one of the six college academic performance outcome variables described above, and
mijkl is an indicator variable equal to one if student i in ﬁrst semester college class group j shares the
classroom with any other students from their same secondary school k who were also admitted to the same
degree during academic year l. However, in this case the variable of interest is sijkl, which represents the
average weighted admission score of secondary school k mates of student i in their ﬁrst semester college
15As discussed in Section 6, the results of the analysis are robust to the substitution of the binomial presence variable for the
actual number of secondary schoolmates in the ﬁrst semester college class group.
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class group j in academic year l. This is interacted with mijkl to account for the fact that many students do
not share their ﬁrst semester college class group with any secondary schoolmates. As before, six additional
student level individual controls xhijklh = {1, ..., 6)} are introduced in the third speciﬁcation for robustness
purposes. These are: (i) Gender (1 = Male); (ii) Weighted Admission Score; (iii) Mother's Educational Level;
(iv) Father's Educational Level; (v) Housing Status (1 = Student lives with both parents); (vi) Region (1 =
Santiago Metropolitan Region). However, in this case two slightly diﬀerent sets of ﬁxed eﬀects are speciﬁed in
the functional form: (a) γjl again accounts for any unobservable idiosyncratic characteristics of ﬁrst semester
college class group j in academic year l; (b) ηkl accounts for any unobservable idiosyncratic characteristics of
students from secondary school k in academic year l (note that in this case it is not possible to substitute ηkl
with µkl to increase precision as before, since the latter does not guarantee that sijkl satisﬁes the standard
exogeneity assumption. Finally, as always the analysis takes into account the potential correlation within
class groups, and corrects for this fact by clustering at the class group and year level (class groups are
considered distinct across admission years).
Finally, this paper also analyzes the impact on academic performance of other characteristics of ﬁrst semester
college class group peers, as detailed below. As always, two linear functional forms are speciﬁed: a baseline
speciﬁcation (which includes only the independent variables of interest and the appropriate ﬁxed eﬀects), and
a extended speciﬁcation (which includes six additional controls for robustness purpose)s. These two linear
regression models are respectively represented as
(V.1) yijkl = β0 + δ
′
1mijkl + δ2sijklmijkl + δ3sijl + δ4Hijkl + δ5p1ijl + δ6p2ijl + ηkl + eijkl
(V.2) yijkl = β0 + δ
′
1mijkl + δ2sijklmijkl + δ3sijl + δ4Hijkl + δ5p1ijl + δ6p2ijl +
6∑
h=1
βhxhijkl + ηkl + eijkl
where as before yijkl is one of the six college academic performance outcome variables described above, mijkl
is an indicator variable equal to one if student i in ﬁrst semester college class group j shares the classroom
with any other students from their same secondary school k who were also admitted to the same degree
during academic year l, and sijkl represents the average weighted admission score of secondary school k
mates of student i in their ﬁrst semester college class group j in academic year l. However, in this case the
variables of interest are the characteristics of all ﬁrst semester college class group peers. To begin with, sijl
represents the average weighted admission score of (all) student i's ﬁrst semester college class group j mates
in academic year l (note that sijl refers to the average weighted admission score of all ﬁrst semester college
classmates, while sijkl refers only to secondary schoolmates in the ﬁrst semester class group). Then, Hijkl
measures the concentration of secondary schools16 in class group j in academic year l, excluding student
16Concentration of secondary schools in the class group is measured as the Herﬁndahl index of secondary school share,
constructed by squaring and adding each secondary school's share in the classroom (i.e. the percentage of students who
attended it before being admitted to the university). In particular:
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i's secondary school k (once again, as mentioned in Section 6, the results of the analysis are robust to the
substitution of the Herﬁndahl index for other secondary school concentration measures). Finally, p1ijl and
p2ijl represent the percentage of student i's ﬁrst semester college class group j mates in academic year l who
attended a public or subsidized secondary school, respectively (note that neither sijl, Hijkl, p1ijl and p2ijl
include student i). Also, as always six additional student level individual controls xhijklh = {1, ..., 6)} are
introduced in the third speciﬁcation for robustness purposes. These are: (i) Gender (1 = Male); (ii) Weighted
Admission Score; (iii) Mother's Educational Level; (iv) Father's Educational Level; (v) Housing Status (1 =
Student lives with both parents); (vi) Region (1 = Santiago Metropolitan Region). However, in this case only
one set of ﬁxed eﬀects is speciﬁed in the functional form17: ηkl accounts for any unobservable idiosyncratic
characteristics of students from secondary school k in academic year l (note that in this case it is again not
possible to substitute ηkl with µkl to increase precision, as the latter does not guarantee that sijl, Hijkl, p1ijl
and p2ijl satisfy the standard exogeneity assumption). Finally, as always the analysis takes into account the
potential correlation within class groups, and corrects for this fact by clustering at the class group and year
level (class groups are considered distinct across admission years).
It is worth noting that the parameters of interest are the δ coeﬃcients, which identify the impact of indepen-
dent variables in each speciﬁcation on the academic performance outcome variables described above (note
that δ1 6= δ′1, and that while in equations III we have that E(yijkl|mijkl = 1) − E(yijkl|mijkl = 0) = δ1, in
equations IV and V it is the case that E(yijkl|mijkl = 1)− E(yijkl|mijkl = 0) = δ′1 + δ2sijkl).
Table II provides an overview of the balance by ﬁrst semester class group of the additional control variables
listed above, i.e. (i) Gender (1 = Male); (ii) Weighted Admission Score; (iii) Mother's Educational Level;
(iv) Father's Educational Level; (v) Housing Status (1 = Student lives with both parents); (6) Region (1 =
Santiago Metropolitan Region). Despite the multidimensionality of the data, and the reduced size of each
ﬁrst semester college class group, the balance seems to be reasonably good. In general, the null hypothesis
of joint orthogonality across class groups during the same admission year cannot be rejected at the 90%
conﬁdence level or higher. However, this null hypothesis is indeed rejected in a few instances, which means
that the balance of the random assignment is not perfect. As discussed in Section 6 this may potentially
cause some robustness concerns.
Hijkl =
∑
k
 njkl∑
k′
njk′l

2
for k 6= ki and k′ 6= k′i
where and skj is the share of students in class group j who attended secondary school k.
17Note that in this case γjl class group ﬁxed eﬀects are not included because although neither sijl, Hijkl, p1ijl and p2ijl
include student i and therefore diﬀer across students within the same class group, the variation at that level is not enough to
avoid acute multi-collinearity problems.
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5. Findings
5.1. Impact of Presence of Secondary Schoolmates
It is not trivial to anticipate what should be, a priori, the impact on undergraduate academic performance
of sharing the same ﬁrst semester classroom with secondary schoolmates. On the one hand, being in a class
group with familiar faces and old acquaintances may ease the adaptation from secondary school to college.
Also, this may allow students to better learn from their classmates, allowing them to beneﬁt from potential
positive learning externalities. However, on the other hand it is also conceivable to imagine that the presence
of secondary schoolmates may increase the temptation to procrastinate, at the expense of academics. Also,
secondary schoolmate presence may discourage students to expand their social network (e.g. if they tend
to orbit towards known acquaintances at the expense of developing new relationships). This may limit the
interaction with other classmates, decreasing the opportunities to beneﬁt from potential positive learning
externalities.
This paper ﬁnds that there is a signiﬁcant negative impact of secondary schoolmate presence in the ﬁrst
semester college classroom, both in terms of lower grades in the medium and long term, and of an increased
likelihood of being dismissed due to poor academic performance. This suggests that the potential negative
eﬀects of a familiar face in the classroom discussed above outweigh its positive ones. In particular, as in
can be observed on Table III.1, students who share their ﬁrst semester college class group with a secondary
schoolmate are 2.7% less likely to graduate (in particular, because they are 1.5% more likely to be dismissed
due to poor academic performance). Also, students who share their ﬁrst semester college class group with a
secondary schoolmate have ﬁrst year and ﬁnal undergraduate Grade Point Averages which are respectively
0.39 and 0.5 points lower (in the Chilean educational system grades range from 1 to 7, which are respectively
the lowest and highest possible scores, and 4 generally is the lowest passing grade). These coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcant with a 90% conﬁdence, and as it can be observed on Table III.2, the results are qualitatively
robust to the inclusion of other student characteristics as additional controls (given the complex nature
of the data exact point estimates can be noisy, and the precision of the analysis decreases as new control
variables are included, but the sign of coeﬃcients is the same and their magnitudes are roughly comparable
when other student characteristics are considered).
Although the fact that no signiﬁcant impact is observed on the likelihood of a student choosing to drop
out may be attributable to limited statistical power, it nonetheless suggests that the negative impact of
secondary schoolmate presence on the ﬁrst semester college class group is mainly attributable to academic
adaptation problems, which result in poor academic performance (as opposite to social adaptation problems,
which result in the student choosing to abandon the undergraduate studies). Also, the fact that the presence
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of secondary schoolmates in the ﬁrst semester college classroom still has a signiﬁcant impact on grades after
many years points to the existence of a path dependence pattern, and suggests that this initial period is key
for student adaptation.
5.2. Impact of Admission Score of Secondary School Mates
It is again not trivial to anticipate what should be, a priori, the impact on undergraduate academic perfor-
mance of sharing the classroom with secondary schoolmates who have a better weighted admission score.
On the one hand, students may be able to beneﬁt from potential positive learning externalities if the peers
with whom they are most likely to interact have a better admission score. However, on the other hand it is
also conceivable to think that those peers with a higher admission score may be more likely to procrastinate
(e.g. if they feel that they can still obtain good grades with reduced eﬀort). In that case, they may drag
the student with them, negatively aﬀecting academic performance.
This paper ﬁnds a signiﬁcant negative impact on short, medium and long term grades of average weighted
admission score of secondary schoolmates in the classroom. This suggests that the above discussed negative
impact of secondary schoolmate presence seems to be aggravated when those secondary schoolmates have
better admission scores. In particular, as it can be observed on Table IV.1 an additional average weighted
admission score18 point in average for secondary schoolmates in the ﬁrst semester class group translates
into between 0.003 and 0.002 less GPA points in the short and medium/long term, respectively (as already
mentioned, in the Chilean educational system grades range from 1 to 7, which are respectively the lowest
and highest possible scores). These coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant with a 95% conﬁdence in the case of short and
medium term grades, and with a 90% conﬁdence in the case of long term grades.
This is perhaps a counter-intuitive result, and it contradicts the ﬁndings of most of the existing literature.
But as already mentioned, the signiﬁcant negative impact of secondary schoolmates' admission scores may
be attributable to secondary schoolmates with better admission scores being more prone to procrastinate
(e.g. if they feel more conﬁdent about still obtaining good grades with reduced eﬀort), and then dragging
the student with them. However, it is worth noting that this impact may also be attributable to other
factors, such as the use of curve grading, existence of teaching to the top practices, and/or expectational
or motivational issues. In any case, the fact that both short and long term grades are aﬀected suggests the
existence of a path-dependence pattern, and/or strong persistence of social ties formed during the ﬁrst college
semester. This points towards teaching to the top or expectational or motivational factors (which aﬀect
18As already mentioned, weighted admission scores for students in both degrees included in the analysis are invariably very
close to the maximum of 850 points, with minimum scores ranging between 705-710 points and maximum ones ranging between
825-830 points.
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the absolute performance of the students in the long term), as opposed to curve grading (which would just
aﬀect relative performance in the short term).19 Also, note that this result does not imply that there do not
exist positive learning externalities from sharing the classroom with students with a better admission score,
but rather, that if they exist, they are more than compensated for by the former (and in fact, there could be
other non-learning positive externalities at play, such as research training or familiarity with the university
environment).
Finally, note that as it can be observed on Table IV.2, in this case the results are not robust to the inclusion
of other student characteristics as additional controls (the coeﬃcients of interest become insigniﬁcant, and
in the case of short term grades even seem to change sign). This is to be expected if those characteristics
are very predictive of test scores (something that the existing literature seems to suggest), but it may also
be pointing to some potential robustness concerns. These are discussed on Section 6.
5.3. Impact of Admission Score of Classmates
Analogously to the previous case, it is not trivial to anticipate what should be, a priori, the impact on
undergraduate academic performance of sharing the classroom with peers who have a better admission score.
As before, on the one hand students may be able to beneﬁt from potential positive learning externalities.
However, on the other hand it is also conceivable to think that those peers with a better secondary education
may be more likely to procrastinate (e.g. if they feel that they can still obtain good grades with reduced eﬀort),
dragging other students with them and negatively impacting their academic performance. Moreover, it is
also not trivial to predict whether the impact of the average admission score of all ﬁrst semester classmates
should be larger or smaller than that of just secondary schoolmates. On the one hand, it is plausible to
imagine that any impact may be ampliﬁed by the larger number of other students, compared to secondary
schoolmates. But on the other hand, if a student interacts mostly with the latter, the impact of the admission
score of all classmates may be more limited.
This paper ﬁnds evidence of a signiﬁcant and persistent negative impact on academic performance of the
average admission score of ﬁrst semester college classmates. This suggests that the above discussed negative
impact of admission score of secondary schoolmates also holds for other students, irrespective of their se-
condary school of origin. In particular, as it can be observed on Table V.1, an additional average weighted
admission score point for classmates in the ﬁrst semester college class group translates, ceteris paribus, into
a reduction of between 0.041 and 0.026 GPA points in the short and medium term, and into 0.018 less GPA
19Note, however, that if students tend to choose the same electives, and try to continue sharing the classroom with their ﬁrst
semester classmates during the rest of their undergraduate studies, curve grading may indeed explain the persistence of lower
grades in the medium and long term.
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points in the long term. These coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant with a 99% conﬁdence in the case of short and
medium term grades, and with a 95% conﬁdence in the case of long term grades.
As discussed in the previous section, this is again a counter-intuitive result, and it contradicts the ﬁndings of
most of the exiting literature. But as already mentioned, this signiﬁcant negative impact may be attributable
to secondary schoolmates with better admission scores feeling more conﬁdent of still obtaining good grades
with reduced eﬀort. If this is the case, it is plausible to think that they are more prone to procrastinate,
dragging other students with them. However, once again it is worth noting that this impact may also be
attributable to other factors, such as the use of curve grading, existence of teaching to the top practices,
and/or expectational or motivational issues. Although in this case the negative impact clearly diminishes as
time passes, the fact that both short and long term grades are aﬀected again suggests the existence of a (time-
attenuated) path-dependence pattern, and/or time persistence of social ties formed during the ﬁrst college
semester. In principle this could again point towards teaching to the top or expectational/motivational
factors (which aﬀect the absolute performance of the students in the long term), but the clear attenuation
and the magnitude of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients would be also be consistent with (explicit or implicit) curve
grading. Also, once again it is important to note that this result does not imply that there do not exist
positive learning externalities from sharing the classroom with students with a better admission score, but
rather that if they exist, they are more than compensated for by the former.
Finally, note that, as it can be observed on Table V.2, these results are again not robust to the inclusion
of other student characteristics as additional controls (the coeﬃcients of interest become much smaller and
insigniﬁcant). As before, this is to be expected if those characteristics are very predictive of test scores (as
the existing literature seems to suggest), but as already mentioned it may also be pointing to some potential
robustness concerns which are discussed on Section 6.
5.4. Impact of Secondary School Concentration
Similarly to the case of secondary schoolmate presence, it is not trivial to anticipate what should be the
impact on undergraduate academic performance of being in a ﬁrst semester college classroom in which there
is a higher concentration of students from the same secondary school(s). On the one hand, having a large
proportion of students who already know each other from secondary school may shut others oﬀ. But on
the other hand, if the main group is already structured, this may facilitate the assimilation of new students
into it. Moreover, it is not trivial to anticipate how being left out (or assimilated) will aﬀect academic
performance. Once again, on the one hand students may beneﬁt from more interaction with their classmates,
but on the other hand that may also increase the opportunities for procrastination and the time devoted to
non-academic activities, at the expense of academic performance.
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This paper ﬁnds a persistent and signiﬁcant negative impact of secondary school concentration in the ﬁrst
semester college classroom, on both short and long term grades, and the likelihood of dismissal. This sug-
gests that that having a large proportion of classmates who come from the same few secondary schools is
detrimental to academic performance. In particular, as it can be observed on Table V.1, an increase of one
decimal point in secondary school concentration (as measured by a Herﬁndahl index)20 ceteris paribus makes
a student's likelihood to be dismissed increase 14 percentage points. Also, it results in 0.97 and 0.79 less GPA
points in the short and medium term, respectively. These coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant with a 90% conﬁdence
in the case of dismissal likelihood, and with a 99% conﬁdence in the case of short and long term grades.
Also, as it can be observed on Table V.2, the results are qualitatively robust to the inclusion of other student
characteristics as additional controls21.
The above is consistent with the already discussed negative impact of secondary schoolmates in the ﬁrst
semester class group, but suggests that having too many students from a few secondary schools in the ﬁrst
semester class group is detrimental to all students in the group, and not only to their secondary schoolmates.
Also, the very large size of the estimated coeﬃcients points to this being a very important issue. Moreover, the
fact that secondary school concentration in the ﬁrst semester class group impacts the likelihood of dismissal,
but not the likelihood of drop out, suggests that it causes academic adaptation problems (as opposed to
social adaptation ones).22
5.5. Impact of Presence of Public and Subsidized Secondary School Students
As always, it is not trivial to anticipate what should be the impact on academic performance of being ran-
domly assigned to a ﬁrst semester college classroom in which there is a larger presence of public or subsidized
school students. Those students, and particularly the former, usually have had a secondary education of lower
quality, and may therefore have signiﬁcant formative gaps (as already mentioned, it is an stylized fact of
20Constructed by squaring and adding each secondary school's share in the classroom, i.e. the percentage of students who
attended it before being admitted to the university. In particular:
Hijkl =
∑
k
 njkl∑
k′
njk′l

2
for k 6= ki and k′ 6= k′i
where and skj is the share of students in class group j who attended secondary school k.
21As in the case of secondary schoolmate presence, given the complex nature of the data, exact point estimates can be noisy,
and the precision of the analysis decreases as new control variables are included. However, although the size of the estimated
coeﬃcient is smaller, the sign of the coeﬃcients of interest is still the same.
22It is also worth noting that in this case there is no evidence of any impact on medium term grades, which goes against
the monotone time patterns observed for the impact of the other variables of interests discussed so far. This suggests that the
relationship between secondary school concentration and academic performance may be more complex, although unfortunately
the reduced form analysis in this paper does not allow to disentangle its exact mechanism.
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Chilean education that there is a very high correlation between secondary school type and socioeconomic
status, as well as between tuition rates and the quality of secondary education: the vast majority of students
from the top quintile of the income distribution attend private secondary schools, while students from the
lowest quintiles usually attend subsidized secondary schools, or public ones if their parents cannot aﬀord
even the subsidized tuition). However, at the same time these students have obtained admission to very
competitive degrees, while often facing much more diﬃculties to do so than their counterparts. Therefore,
they may have comparable or even greater innate skills than their private school peers, and/or they may
be more motivated (since students from private secondary schools usually come from the top quintile of
the income distribution, their outside option may be much higher than that of public or subsidized school
students from lower quintiles, potentially reducing motivation and eﬀort).
This paper ﬁnds evidence that students assigned to a ﬁrst semester college classroom with a higher percentage
of public or subsidized secondary school students are more likely to be dismissed. However, while there is
some evidence that an increased presence of public school students may ceteris paribus result in slightly lower
grades, this paper ﬁnds that an increased presence of subsidized school students may conversely result in
slightly higher grades. In particular, as it can be observed on Table V.1, an increase of one percentage point in
the share of public secondary school students in the ﬁrst semester classroom ceteris paribus makes a student's
likelihood to graduate and be dismissed decrease 0.29 and increase 0.21 percentage points, respectively.23
Similarly, an increase of one percentage point in the share of subsidized secondary school students in the
ﬁrst semester classroom ceteris paribus makes a student's likelihood to be dismissed increase 0.16 percentage
points. However, an increase of one percentage point in the share of subsidized secondary school students in
the ﬁrst semester classroom ceteris paribus results in about 0.009 and 0.007 more GPA points in the short
and medium term, respectively. These coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant with a 95% and 90% conﬁdence in the case
of public and subsidized secondary school presence, respectively, and are qualitatively robust to the inclusion
of other student characteristics as additional controls.
The above suggests that although positive learning externalities may in some cases be overshadowed by other
factors (as discussed in previous sections), they still matter. The lower average quality of the education of
subsidized and public secondary school students, and particularly of the latter, seems to not only aﬀect their
performance, but also that of their ﬁrst semester college classmates. Also, note that although the size of both
eﬀects seems to be small, the negative impact of increased public secondary school presence on the dismissal
likelihood seems to be larger than that of a higher percentage of subsidized secondary school students. This
is consistent with the stylized fact of subsidized secondary schools generally oﬀering a education of higher
quality, compared to their public counterparts. Moreover, the fact that a larger presence of subsidized school
23Although the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant at the 90% level, as mentioned there is some evidence that an increase of one
percentage point in the share of public secondary school students in the ﬁrst semester classroom ceteris paribus may result in
about 0.005 less GPA points in the short and medium term.
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students in the ﬁrst semester college class group has a positive impact on grades suggests that, in their case,
increased motivation and eﬀort may more than compensate for any gaps in their secondary education 24.
Finally, the fact that this positive impact on grades only lasts until the medium term again suggest that
learning externalities may be the main driver behind this impact. However, in any case the fact that there
is still some persistence beyond the ﬁrst semester once more points to the existence of a path-dependence
pattern.
5.6. Diﬀerences by Degree
When looking separately at students admitted to each of the two degrees under study, the results are
consistent with the above discussed ﬁndings. There is evidence of some diﬀerences across students from
the two degrees, but the results are noisier and no robust pattern is observable, and they are therefore no
presented on this paper.25
5.7. Diﬀerences by Secondary School Type
As in the previous case, when allowing for the coeﬃcients of interest to vary with the type of secondary
school of origin, the results are qualitatively comparable to the above discussed ﬁndings. There is evidence of
some diﬀerential impacts across secondary school type, but once again the results are noisier and, no robust
pattern is observable. These results are therefore no presented on this paper.26.
24Note, however, that the opposite signs of the impact on grades and likelihood of dismissal could also likely be due to
students with lower grades being dismissed, therefore increasing the average grades for those who continue their studies.
25When making cross-degree comparisons it is worth noting that the assignment to each degree is not random, allowing for
self-selection and potentially resulting in very diﬀerent student proﬁles in Engineering and Commercial Engineering. Also, note
that, as expected, population size problems are aggravated when looking at each degree separately. This may be the reason
why some signiﬁcant eﬀects are only found on the Engineering subpopulation, since it is much larger than the Commercial
Engineering one. Therefore, this type of diﬀerential impacts across degrees should not be viewed as exceedingly robust.
26Note that the limited number of students from subsidized and public schools results in limited power to detect diﬀerentiated
impacts by school type, and may potentially be causing near-complete determination problems and increased sensibility of on
point estimates to alternative speciﬁcations and estimation methods. This is only a concern when looking at the diﬀerentiated
impact by school type, and should not aﬀect the general results presented in this paper, which are applicable to all school types.
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6. Robustness
The main results presented in this paper are robust to the use of Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent
estimation, instead of clustered standard errors at the class group level. Also, results regarding the negative
impact of secondary school classmate presence on academic performance are robust to alternative speciﬁca-
tions (e.g. including school*year*degree ﬁxed eﬀects, or the use of number of secondary school class mates
variable, instead of a binomial one simply denoting presence or absence). Moreover, results regarding the
negative impact of peer admission score on academic performance are robust to the inclusion of secondary
school class mate presence as an independent variable in the speciﬁcation. Results regarding the negative
impact of secondary school concentration on academic performance are also robust to the use of alternative
measures of school concentration (e.g. number of schools with more than a 5% or 10% share of students in
the classroom, or the share of students in the class group belonging to the top 1, top 2, top 3, top 5 and top
10 most represented schools).
Although the additional controls included in the full speciﬁcation are not guaranteed to be exogenous in this
context (and are therefore not discussed in this paper), it is worth noting that their estimated coeﬃcients
are consistent with the literature ﬁndings, as well as with the anecdotical evidence.27
However, it is worth noting that, although a population consisting of a few thousand observations is analyzed,
given the complexity of the data structure at the end of the day there is limited statistical power, and
small size eﬀects may go undetected. Therefore, the discussion of the ﬁndings in this paper focuses on the
signiﬁcant impacts found, rather than on the lack of impact, which could be attributable to low statistical
power problems. Also, point estimates should be used with caution for policy purposes, since they are usually
more sensitive to the structure of the data than the sign of estimated coeﬃcient.
Similarly to the above, although it would in principle be possible to perform the analysis on other degrees,
the reduced number of students enrolled in them (and/or the number of suitable yearly data available)
mean that the resulting population size would only allow for a very limited statistical power. Therefore, only
very large eﬀects could be detected, unless the information was pooled across degrees (in which case only
aggregated peer eﬀects could be estimated with more precision). However, other degrees also experienced
curricular changes, which make the comparison across time cohorts very diﬃcult (or outright impossible).
27For example, the weighted average admission score is the best predictor of academic performance. Also, students from
public and subsidized secondary schools are less likely to graduate and have lower grades, while male students have lower grades
than female ones. The educational level of parents has a positive impact on academic performance, and students who live with
their parents perform better during their undergraduate studies. Finally, students from the Santiago metropolitan region have
a better academic performance than their peers from other areas of the country.
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Moreover, as expected non-linear models (such as probit or logit) are very problematic in this setting, due
to the large number of ﬁxed eﬀects which need to be included in the speciﬁcations (i.e. in order to account
for the idiosyncratic diﬀerences across secondary schools of origin and class groups). However, note that the
linear speciﬁcations discussed in this paper have a better ﬁt (as measured by the adjusted R2 coeﬃcient)
when applied to grades as the dependent variable, instead than to the likelihood of graduation, drop out or
dismissal. This is to be expected, given the binomial nature of the latter, and means that ceteris paribus it
will be easier to detect and measure the impact of peers on grades.
Finally, as already mentioned, note that the results concerning the impact of admission scores of ﬁrst semester
college classmates are not robust to the inclusion of other student characteristics as additional controls (the
coeﬃcients of interest become insigniﬁcant, and in an instance even seem to change sign). As discussed
in the relevant sections above, this is to be expected if those characteristics are very predictive of test
scores (something that the existing literature seems to suggest). However, in principle this may also point
to balance problems. Or, given that (according to Table II) the additional control variables do not seem
to be particularly imbalanced across class groups, this may also suggest that the impact of the admission
score of ﬁrst semester college classmates varies with some of the additional control variables included in the
extended speciﬁcation. This would mean that the coeﬃcients for the admission score of ﬁrst semester college
classmates in the regression can no longer be interpreted a simple diﬀerential impact, and that interaction
terms between the variable of interest and the additional controls must be included.
7. Conclusion
This paper takes advantage of a natural experiment, by which ﬁrst year college students at one of the leading
Chilean universities are randomly assigned to their ﬁrst semester college class groups, in order to robustly
estimate peer eﬀects on undergraduate academic performance. The research hypothesis is that being assigned
as a freshman to a group with more or less students from a same school, or from a given socioeconomic
background, may result in very diﬀerent patterns of adaptation and impact academic performance. This paper
ﬁnds that, contrary to the evidence in most of the existing literature, the average standardized admission score
of ﬁrst semester college classmates no only seems to have no positive impact on undergraduate grades, but
actually may have a negative one. Also, although there are some diﬀerences across degrees and secondary
school type, college students who share their ﬁrst semester classroom with a secondary schoolmate are
generally more likely to be dismissed due to poor academic performance, and have lower grades. Moreover,
students assigned to ﬁrst semester college classrooms with a higher concentration of classmates who attended
the same secondary school(s) have signiﬁcantly lower grades, and are less likely to graduate. Finally, students
who share their ﬁrst semester college classroom with peers from public or subsidized secondary schools are
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more likely to be dismissed due to poor academic performance. All these impacts are generally persistent
in time, pointing to the existence of a path dependence pattern, and suggesting that this initial period in
college is key for student adaptation.
All the above has important implications for educational policy. First of all, the negative impact of secondary
schoolmate presence for all types of students suggests that it would be advisable to assign freshmen to college
class groups so that, whenever possible, they do not share their ﬁrst semester classroom with any secondary
schoolmates. Moreover, the large negative impact of secondary school concentration suggests that it would
be advisable to group freshmen, so that students who attended the same secondary school are as spread as
possible across class groups. Similarly, given the observed small but signiﬁcant negative impact of sharing
the classroom with a larger percentage of public or subsidized school students, it seems that it would also be
advisable to spread this type of students across class groups. All this would be achievable by implementing
targeted, multidimensional ﬁrst semester classroom assignment policies.28
Second of all, the persistence of the observed impacts derived from ﬁrst semester class group composition
suggest that this is a very important period. Therefore, it may be advisable to even more so focus the
transitional aid on the ﬁrst semester, and/or potentially on the summer before starting college. Also, the
detected negative impacts on the likelihood of graduation seem to be channeled through an increased proba-
bility of being dismissed due to poor academic performance. This suggests that, apart from facilitating the
social adaptation of students to their new environment, special attention should still continue to be paid to
academic training (remedial or otherwise).
Finally, although no clear pattern is observed, and results are therefore not presented on this paper, there
seem to exist some diﬀerential impacts by degree and secondary school type. This suggests that one-size-ﬁts-
all transitional-aid programs may be less likely to succeed than programs tailored to the speciﬁc needs of each
student proﬁle in each degree. Also, students from public and subsidized secondary schools seem to be at a
disadvantage, and may be negatively impacting their peers. This suggests that it would be advisable to put a
special focus on helping this type of students to catch up (ideally with summer courses before starting college,
in order to avoid a substitution eﬀect between time devoted to regular subjects and remedial training).
However, as the positive impact of subsidized secondary school student presence suggests, it seems that,
without the formative shortcomings associated to the lower quality of their secondary education, public
and subsidized secondary school students may instead potentially have a positive impact on their peers.
Therefore, the ﬁrst best solution to access to higher education barriers would be to address the quality gap
in secondary education (between public and subsidized schools, and their private counterparts).
28Note however that as Carrell et al (2013) point out optimal assignment policies may be unsuccessful if students endogenously
form sub-groups. Also, the impact of optimal assignment will be weakened if students prefer to interact with a particular set of
students even when they are outside their assigned group
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TABLE I 
DISTRIBUTION OF FIRST SEMESTER COLLEGE STUDENTS 
              
           Commercial Engineering Degree  
 
Engineering Degree 
  Secondary School Type 
 
 
   
Secondary School Type  
Year Group Public Subsidized Private Total    Group Public Subsidized Private Total 
2000 1 1 3 51 55    1 3 2 45 50 
 2 4 7 41 52    2 3 2 43 48 
 3 1 6 45 52    3 4 1 42 47 
 4 1 9 43 53    4 3 7 40 50 
 … … … … …    5 7 4 37 48 
 … … … … …    6 1 3 44 48 
 … … … … …    7 2 5 38 45 
 … … … … …    8 1 5 39 45 
 All 7 25 180 212    All 24 29 328 381 
2001 1 6 3 45 54    1 5 4 41 50 
 2 2 1 50 53    2 3 4 39 46 
 3 2 3 49 54    3 3 5 38 46 
 4 4 2 47 53    4 5 3 35 43 
 … … … … …    5 7 2 41 50 
 … … … … …    6 2 1 45 48 
 All 14 9 191 214    All 25 19 239 283 
2002 1 6 3 42 51    1 0 4 44 48 
 2 2 12 38 52    2 4 6 39 49 
 3 5 4 44 53    3 6 5 35 46 
 4 3 3 51 57    4 4 5 40 49 
 … … … … …    5 3 3 39 45 
 … … … … …    6 1 2 47 50 
 All 16 22 175 213    All 18 25 244 287 
2003 1 4 4 43 51    1 4 3 42 49 
 2 0 3 48 51    2 3 8 36 47 
 3 1 7 45 53    3 5 4 37 46 
 4 4 4 41 49    4 5 6 35 46 
 … … … … …    5 6 3 36 45 
 … … … … …    6 1 2 45 48 
 All 9 18 177 204    All 24 26 231 281 
2004 1 0 2 52 54    1 6 3 39 48 
 2 1 6 49 56    2 9 4 32 45 
 3 2 5 43 50    3 7 7 35 49 
 4 2 3 53 58    4 4 5 39 48 
 … … … … …    5 5 2 40 47 
 … … … … …    6 4 4 41 49 
 All 5 16 197 218    All 35 25 226 286 
2005 1 3 3 50 56    1 1 8 41 50 
 2 0 5 49 54    2 7 3 35 45 
 3 3 6 45 54    3 3 5 41 49 
 4 1 2 53 56    4 4 4 34 42 
 … … … … …    5 3 4 40 47 
 … … … … …    6 4 5 37 46 
 All 7 16 197 220    All 22 29 228 279 
2006 1 0 5 51 56    1 6 2 40 48 
 2 2 3 47 52    2 4 6 36 46 
 3 3 0 47 50    3 3 6 39 48 
 4 2 4 48 54    4 8 6 35 49 
 … … … … …    5 4 3 40 47 
 … … … … …    6 7 4 34 45 
 … … … … …    7 2 5 38 45 
 … … … … …    8 7 3 35 45 
 All 7 12 193 212    All 41 35 297 373 
Total  123 224 2427 2774   Total 317 326 3142 3785 
               
NOTES. Distribution of first semester college students in the Commercial Engineering and Engineering degrees 
at one of the leading Chilean universities. The data set has been constructed using the administrative data routinely 
gathered by the university from 2000 to 2012, and it includes all students who entered the Commercial Engineering and 
Engineering degrees at the university via ordinary admission process between 2000 and 2006. 
26
TABLE II  
BALANCE BY ADMISSION YEAR AND CLASS GROUP  
           II.A. Commercial Engineering Degree 
           Year Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Obs. 
2000 1 727.37 0.44 8.24 8.44 0.85 0.84 0.02 0.05 55 
 2 726.47 0.58 7.69 8.17 0.77 0.73 0.08 0.13 52 
 3 727.61 0.56 8.06 8.44 0.73 0.85 0.02 0.12 52 
 4 726.02 0.66 8.19 8.58 0.77 0.83 0.02 0.17 53 
 p-value 0.97 0.13 0.23 0.42 047 0.40 0.25 0.31  
2001 1 730.52 0.61 7.94 8.20 0.87 0.85 0.11 0.06 54 
 2 731.72 0.62 7.77 8.60 0.87 0.92 0.04 0.02 53 
 3 732.07 0.44 7.91 8.24 0.74 0.83 0.04 0.06 54 
 4 729.24 0.58 7.96 8.23 0.73 0.85 0.08 0.04 52 
 p-value 0.84 0.22 0.91 0.43 0.12 0.53 0.35 0.75  
2002 1 734.08 0.55 7.90 8.00 0.90 0.86 0.12 0.06 51 
 2 732.70 0.50 8.04 8.17 0.77 0.73 0.04 0.23 52 
 3 730.85 0.49 8.11 8.42 0.83 0.87 0.09 0.08 53 
 4 731.82 0.40 8.10 8.33 0.83 0.84 0.05 0.05 58 
 p-value 0.78 0.38 0.90 0.54 0.36 0.21 0.39 0.01  
2003 1 732.32 0.69 8.08 8.43 0.86 0.88 0.08 0.08 51 
 2 732.57 0.39 8.06 8.49 0.78 0.92 0.00 0.06 51 
 3 730.76 0.53 7.60 8.19 0.79 0.83 0.02 0.13 53 
 4 730.08 0.57 7.96 8.35 0.84 0.86 0.08 0.08 49 
 p-value 0.86 0.03 0.47 0.73 0.70 0.56 0.10 0.60  
2004 1 744.05 0.52 8.07 8.48 0.80 0.87 0.00 0.04 54 
 2 744.76 0.52 7.89 8.25 0.73 0.86 0.02 0.11 56 
 3 744.92 0.60 7.86 8.54 0.82 0.90 0.04 0.10 50 
 4 744.53 0.57 7.76 8.29 0.79 0.84 0.03 0.05 58 
 p-value 1.00 0.80 0.78 0.66 0.72 0.86 0.51 0.41  
2005 1 741.34 0.50 8.27 8.63 0.80 0.79 0.05 0.05 56 
 2 742.86 0.54 8.17 8.44 0.87 0.80 0.00 0.09 54 
 3 742.54 0.52 7.76 8.33 0.85 0.85 0.06 0.11 54 
 4 739.62 0.59 8.50 8.64 0.71 0.80 0.02 0.04 56 
 p-value 0.92 0.81 0.05 0.46 0.16 0.83 0.27 0.41  
2006 1 747.90 0.55 8.32 8.61 0.82 0.80 0.00 0.09 56 
 2 746.31 0.48 7.69 8.48 0.73 0.88 0.04 0.06 52 
 3 746.25 0.62 7.98 8.70 0.72 0.84 0.06 0.00 50 
 4 746.67 0.54 8.09 8.74 0.81 0.89 0.04 0.07 54 
 p-value 0.98 0.57 0.20 0.59 0.46 0.55 0.38 0.22  
            
NOTES. The data set has been constructed using the administrative data routinely gathered by the university from 2000 to 2012, 
and it includes all students who entered the Commercial Engineering degree at the university via ordinary admission process between 
2000 and 2006. Assignment of students to their first semester college class group was random. Each cell presents the mean of the balance 
variable (column) in each class group (row). Balance variables are: (1) weighted admission score, (2) gender (1 = male), (3) mother's 
educational level, (4) father’s educational level, (5) housing status (1 = student lives with both parents), (6) region (1 = Santiago 
Metropolitan Region), (7) secondary school type (1 = public), (8) secondary school type (1 = subsidized). Reported p-values are for joint 
orthogonality test across class groups during the same admission year for each of the corresponding balance variables.. 
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 II.B. Engineering Degree 
           Year Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Obs. 
2000 2 739.56 0.86 8.28 8.32 0.70 0.72 0.06 0.04 50 
 3 738.34 0.85 7.85 8.13 0.75 0.75 0.06 0.04 48 
 4 740.70 0.83 8.26 8.38 0.74 0.85 0.09 0.02 47 
 5 739.35 0.80 7.98 8.18 0.84 0.84 0.06 0.14 50 
 6 739.01 0.81 8.17 8.50 0.79 0.81 0.15 0.08 48 
 7 739.82 0.79 7.69 8.06 0.85 0.92 0.02 0.06 48 
 8 738.85 0.76 7.78 8.11 0.78 0.80 0.04 0.11 45 
 9 739.41 0.87 7.73 8.24 0.80 0.80 0.02 0.11 45 
 p-value 1.00 0.86 0.40 0.83 0.64 0.32 0.26 0.30  
2001 1 753.33 0.92 7.72 7.82 0.86 0.80 0.10 0.08 50 
 2 752.57 0.85 7.43 8.39 0.85 0.85 0.07 0.09 46 
 3 751.14 0.83 8.07 8.26 0.78 0.85 0.07 0.11 46 
 4 749.02 0.91 7.77 8.40 0.86 0.84 0.12 0.07 43 
 5 750.31 0.88 7.52 7.84 0.86 0.86 0.14 0.04 50 
 7 749.99 0.83 8.08 8.54 0.85 0.79 0.04 0.02 48 
 p-value 0.92 0.67 0.32 0.07 0.90 0.93 0.54 0.57  
2002 1 738.03 0.90 7.63 8.13 0.77 0.73 0.00 0.08 48 
 2 738.72 0.92 8.04 8.29 0.82 0.84 0.08 0.12 49 
 3 738.20 0.87 7.87 8.24 0.76 0.72 0.13 0.11 46 
 4 737.26 0.88 7.71 7.96 0.78 0.84 0.08 0.10 49 
 5 740.09 0.80 7.69 8.53 0.73 0.78 0.07 0.07 45 
 7 737.96 0.78 8.18 8.34 0.84 0.78 0.02 0.04 50 
 p-value 0.99 0.32 0.49 0.51 0.84 0.61 0.11 0.73  
2003 1 738.23 0.88 7.84 8.16 0.76 0.82 0.08 0.06 49 
 2 739.12 0.79 7.89 8.00 0.70 0.74 0.06 0.17 47 
 3 736.76 0.65 8.00 8.30 0.78 0.80 0.11 0.09 46 
 4 738.45 0.89 7.33 7.67 0.70 0.67 0.11 0.13 46 
 5 738.15 0.87 7.53 8.36 0.76 0.64 0.13 0.07 45 
 7 736.55 0.79 8.38 8.56 0.71 0.73 0.02 0.04 48 
 p-value 0.99 0.03 0.08 0.24 0.91 0.35 0.44 0.26  
2004 1 757.16 0.88 8.00 8.52 0.83 0.85 0.13 0.06 48 
 2 756.79 0.98 7.31 7.73 0.73 0.80 0.20 0.09 45 
 3 757.44 0.80 7.67 8.31 0.80 0.76 0.14 0.14 49 
 4 755.68 0.90 8.06 8.06 0.75 0.77 0.08 0.10 48 
 5 757.35 0.83 8.06 8.28 0.79 0.77 0.11 0.04 47 
 7 756.69 0.84 7.96 8.04 0.71 0.80 0.08 0.08 49 
 p-value 1.00 0.14 0.24 0.24 0.76 0.87 0.52 0.61  
2005 1 767.66 0.92 7.92 7.96 0.76 0.84 0.02 0.16 50 
 2 768.24 0.96 7.89 8.27 0.69 0.80 0.16 0.07 45 
 3 766.14 0.88 7.61 7.82 0.80 0.78 0.06 0.10 49 
 4 767.75 0.81 7.93 8.31 0.81 0.76 0.10 0.10 42 
 5 765.61 0.74 7.87 8.26 0.91 0.74 0.06 0.09 47 
 7 767.03 0.89 7.91 8.17 0.76 0.80 0.09 0.11 46 
 p-value 0.99 0.04 0.94 0.64 0.17 0.90 0.26 0.77  
2006 1 774.80 0.85 8.10 8.38 0.67 0.85 0.13 0.04 48 
 2 774.96 0.74 8.24 8.35 0.70 0.85 0.09 0.13 46 
 3 772.46 0.79 7.88 8.58 0.83 0.77 0.06 0.13 48 
 4 774.47 0.86 7.61 8.37 0.80 0.76 0.16 0.12 49 
 5 774.14 0.83 8.00 8.17 0.79 0.79 0.09 0.06 47 
 6 772.69 0.82 8.00 8.20 0.71 0.73 0.16 0.09 45 
 7 773.30 0.84 8.07 8.24 0.73 0.73 0.04 0.11 45 
 8 774.16 0.93 8.18 8.38 0.71 0.82 0.16 0.07 45 
 p-value 1.00 0.41 0.66 0.89 0.57 0.72 0.43 0.74  
            
NOTES. The data set has been constructed using the administrative data routinely gathered by the university from 2000 to 2012, 
and it includes all students who entered the Engineering degree at the university via ordinary admission process between 2000 and 2006. 
Assignment of students to their first semester college class group was random. Each cell presents the mean of the balance variable 
(column) in each class group (row). Balance variables are: (1) weighted admission score, (2) gender (1 = male), (3) mother's educational 
level, (4) father’s educational level, (5) housing status (1 = student lives with both parents), (6) region (1 = Santiago Metropolitan 
Region), (7) secondary school type (1 = public), (8) secondary school type (1 = subsidized). Reported p-values are for joint orthogonality 
test across class groups during the same admission year for each of the corresponding balance variables.. 
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 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
m
ea
su
re
s, 
pr
es
en
te
d 
ho
riz
on
ta
lly
, i
n 
pa
rti
cu
la
r: 
(1
) 
gr
ad
ua
tio
n 
lik
el
ih
oo
d,
 (
2)
 d
ro
p 
ou
t l
ik
el
ih
oo
d,
 (
3)
 d
is
m
is
sa
l l
ik
el
ih
oo
d,
 (
4)
 1
st
 s
em
es
te
r 
G
PA
, (
5)
 1
st
 y
ea
r 
G
PA
 a
nd
 (
6)
 fi
na
l G
PA
. T
w
o 
se
ts
 o
f 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 a
re
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 s
ta
ck
ed
 o
ve
r e
ac
h 
ot
he
r, 
w
ith
 th
e 
on
e 
ab
ov
e 
(I
II
.1
) i
nc
lu
di
ng
 o
nl
y 
th
e 
va
ria
bl
e 
of
 in
te
re
st
ed
 a
nd
 th
e 
on
e 
be
lo
w
 (I
II
.2
) i
nc
lu
di
ng
 o
th
er
 s
tu
de
nt
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
as
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 
co
nt
ro
ls
, n
am
el
y:
 g
en
de
r (
1 
= 
m
al
e)
, w
ei
gh
te
d 
ad
m
is
si
on
 s
co
re
, m
ot
he
r’
s 
ed
uc
at
io
na
l l
ev
el
, f
at
he
r’
s 
ed
uc
at
io
na
l l
ev
el
, h
ou
si
ng
 s
ta
tu
s 
(1
 =
 s
tu
de
nt
 li
ve
s 
w
ith
 b
ot
h 
pa
re
nt
s)
 a
nd
 re
gi
on
 (1
 =
 S
an
tia
go
 
M
et
ro
po
lit
an
 R
eg
io
n)
. B
ot
h 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 in
cl
ud
e 
tw
o 
se
ts
 o
f f
ix
ed
 e
ffe
ct
s:
 (i
) a
dm
is
si
on
 y
ea
r *
 fi
rs
t s
em
es
te
r c
ol
le
ge
 c
la
ss
 g
ro
up
 *
 d
eg
re
e,
 (i
i) 
nu
m
be
r o
f s
am
e 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 s
tu
de
nt
s 
ad
m
itt
ed
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ye
ar
 to
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
de
gr
ee
. T
he
 la
tte
r a
llo
w
s 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 p
re
ci
si
on
 b
y 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s 
w
hi
le
 s
til
l e
ns
ur
in
g 
th
at
 th
e 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 m
at
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
sa
tis
fie
s 
th
e 
ex
og
en
ei
ty
 c
on
di
tio
n.
 S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 a
re
 c
lu
st
er
ed
 b
y 
ad
m
is
si
on
 y
ea
r *
 fi
rs
t s
em
es
te
r c
ol
le
ge
 c
la
ss
 g
ro
up
 *
 d
eg
re
e.
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* 
p<
0.
1;
 *
* 
p<
0.
05
; *
**
 p
<0
.0
1 
NO
TE
S. 
Th
is
 ta
bl
e 
an
al
yz
es
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f t
he
 a
ve
ra
ge
 w
ei
gh
te
d 
ad
m
is
si
on
 s
co
re
 o
f s
ec
on
da
ry
 s
ch
oo
l m
at
es
 in
 a
 s
tu
de
nt
’s
 fi
rs
t s
em
es
te
r c
ol
le
ge
 c
la
ss
 g
ro
up
 in
 th
e 
C
om
m
er
ci
al
 E
ng
in
ee
rin
g 
an
d 
En
gi
ne
er
in
g 
de
gr
ee
s 
at
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 le
ad
in
g 
C
hi
le
an
 u
ni
ve
rs
iti
es
. T
he
 a
ss
ig
nm
en
t t
o 
th
es
e 
fir
st
 s
em
es
te
r c
ol
le
ge
 c
la
ss
 g
ro
up
s 
is
 ra
nd
om
, a
llo
w
in
g 
to
 tr
ea
t p
ee
r c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
as
 e
xo
ge
no
us
. T
he
 
da
ta
 s
et
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
tru
ct
ed
 u
si
ng
 t
he
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
da
ta
 r
ou
tin
el
y 
ga
th
er
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 f
ro
m
 2
00
0 
to
 2
01
2,
 a
nd
 i
t 
in
cl
ud
es
 a
ll 
st
ud
en
ts
 w
ho
 e
nt
er
ed
 t
he
 C
om
m
er
ci
al
 E
ng
in
ee
rin
g 
an
d 
En
gi
ne
er
in
g 
de
gr
ee
s 
at
 th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 v
ia
 o
rd
in
ar
y 
ad
m
is
si
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
00
 a
nd
 2
00
6.
 T
he
 im
pa
ct
 o
f t
he
 a
ve
ra
ge
 w
ei
gh
te
d 
ad
m
is
si
on
 s
co
re
 o
f s
ec
on
da
ry
 s
ch
oo
l m
at
es
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 s
em
es
te
r 
co
lle
ge
 c
la
ss
 g
ro
up
 is
 e
va
lu
at
ed
 o
n 
si
x 
ac
ad
em
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 m
ea
su
re
s, 
pr
es
en
te
d 
ho
riz
on
ta
lly
, i
n 
pa
rti
cu
la
r: 
(1
) 
gr
ad
ua
tio
n 
lik
el
ih
oo
d,
 (
2)
 d
ro
p 
ou
t l
ik
el
ih
oo
d,
 (
3)
 d
is
m
is
sa
l l
ik
el
ih
oo
d,
 (
4)
 1
st
 
se
m
es
te
r G
PA
, (
5)
 1
st
 y
ea
r G
PA
 a
nd
 (6
) f
in
al
 G
PA
. T
w
o 
se
ts
 o
f s
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
 a
re
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 s
ta
ck
ed
 o
ve
r e
ac
h 
ot
he
r, 
w
ith
 th
e 
on
e 
ab
ov
e 
(I
V
.1
) i
nc
lu
di
ng
 o
nl
y 
th
e 
va
ria
bl
e 
of
 in
te
re
st
ed
 a
nd
 th
e 
on
e 
be
lo
w
 (
IV
.2
) 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
ot
he
r 
st
ud
en
t c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
as
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 c
on
tro
ls
, n
am
el
y:
 g
en
de
r 
(1
 =
 m
al
e)
, w
ei
gh
te
d 
ad
m
is
si
on
 s
co
re
, m
ot
he
r’
s 
ed
uc
at
io
na
l l
ev
el
, f
at
he
r’
s 
ed
uc
at
io
na
l l
ev
el
, h
ou
si
ng
 
st
at
us
 (
1 
= 
st
ud
en
t l
iv
es
 w
ith
 b
ot
h 
pa
re
nt
s)
 a
nd
 r
eg
io
n 
(1
 =
 S
an
tia
go
 M
et
ro
po
lit
an
 R
eg
io
n)
. B
ot
h 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 in
cl
ud
e 
tw
o 
se
ts
 o
f 
fix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
: (
i) 
ad
m
is
si
on
 y
ea
r 
* 
fir
st
 s
em
es
te
r 
co
lle
ge
 c
la
ss
 
gr
ou
p 
* 
de
gr
ee
, (
ii)
 a
dm
is
si
on
 y
ea
r *
 se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 *
 d
eg
re
e.
 S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 a
re
 c
lu
st
er
ed
 b
y 
ad
m
is
si
on
 y
ea
r *
 fi
rs
t s
em
es
te
r c
ol
le
ge
 c
la
ss
 g
ro
up
 *
 d
eg
re
e.
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1 
NO
TE
S. 
Th
is
 ta
bl
e 
an
al
yz
es
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f f
irs
t s
em
es
te
r c
ol
le
ge
 c
la
ss
 g
ro
up
 p
ee
r c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
on
 s
tu
de
nt
s 
in
 th
e 
C
om
m
er
ci
al
 E
ng
in
ee
rin
g 
an
d 
En
gi
ne
er
in
g 
de
gr
ee
s 
at
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 le
ad
in
g 
C
hi
le
an
 u
ni
ve
rs
iti
es
. 
Th
e 
as
si
gn
m
en
t 
to
 t
he
se
 f
irs
t 
se
m
es
te
r 
co
lle
ge
 c
la
ss
 g
ro
up
s 
is
 r
an
do
m
, 
al
lo
w
in
g 
to
 t
re
at
 p
ee
r 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
as
 e
xo
ge
no
us
. 
Th
e 
da
ta
 s
et
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
co
ns
tru
ct
ed
 u
si
ng
 t
he
 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
da
ta
 r
ou
tin
el
y 
ga
th
er
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 f
ro
m
 2
00
0 
to
 2
01
2,
 a
nd
 it
 in
cl
ud
es
 a
ll 
st
ud
en
ts
 w
ho
 e
nt
er
ed
 th
e 
C
om
m
er
ci
al
 E
ng
in
ee
rin
g 
an
d 
En
gi
ne
er
in
g 
de
gr
ee
s 
at
 th
e 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 v
ia
 
or
di
na
ry
 a
dm
is
si
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
00
 a
nd
 2
00
6.
 F
ou
r p
ee
r c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
ar
e 
st
ud
ie
d:
 (a
) a
ve
ra
ge
 w
ei
gh
te
d 
ad
m
is
si
on
 sc
or
e 
of
 o
th
er
 st
ud
en
ts
 in
 g
ro
up
, (
b)
 se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 c
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
cl
as
s g
ro
up
, m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 th
e 
su
m
 o
f t
he
 sq
ua
re
 o
f t
he
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 st
ud
en
ts
 fr
om
 e
ac
h 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 in
 th
e 
cl
as
s g
ro
up
, (
c)
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 p
ub
lic
 se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 st
ud
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
cl
as
s g
ro
up
, a
nd
 
(d
) p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 s
ub
si
di
ze
d 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 s
tu
de
nt
s 
in
 th
e 
cl
as
sr
oo
m
. T
he
 im
pa
ct
 o
f t
he
se
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 is
 e
va
lu
at
ed
 o
n 
si
x 
ac
ad
em
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 m
ea
su
re
s, 
pr
es
en
te
d 
ho
riz
on
ta
lly
, i
n 
pa
rti
cu
la
r: 
(1
) 
gr
ad
ua
tio
n 
lik
el
ih
oo
d,
 (2
) d
ro
p 
ou
t l
ik
el
ih
oo
d,
 (3
) d
is
m
is
sa
l l
ik
el
ih
oo
d,
 (4
) 1
st
 s
em
es
te
r G
PA
, (
5)
 1
st
 y
ea
r G
PA
 a
nd
 (6
) f
in
al
 G
PA
. T
w
o 
se
ts
 o
f s
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
 a
re
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 s
ta
ck
ed
 o
ve
r e
ac
h 
ot
he
r, 
w
ith
 th
e 
on
e 
ab
ov
e 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
on
ly
 th
e 
va
ria
bl
e 
of
 in
te
re
st
ed
 a
nd
 th
e 
on
e 
be
lo
w
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
ot
he
r s
tu
de
nt
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
as
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 c
on
tro
ls
, n
am
el
y:
 g
en
de
r (
1 
= 
m
al
e)
, w
ei
gh
te
d 
ad
m
is
si
on
 s
co
re
, 
m
ot
he
r’
s e
du
ca
tio
na
l l
ev
el
, f
at
he
r’
s e
du
ca
tio
na
l l
ev
el
, h
ou
si
ng
 st
at
us
 (1
 =
 st
ud
en
t l
iv
es
 w
ith
 b
ot
h 
pa
re
nt
s)
 a
nd
 re
gi
on
 (1
 =
 S
an
tia
go
 M
et
ro
po
lit
an
 R
eg
io
n)
. B
ot
h 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 in
cl
ud
e 
ad
m
is
si
on
 y
ea
r 
* 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 *
 d
eg
re
e 
fix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
. S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 a
re
 c
lu
st
er
ed
 b
y 
ad
m
is
si
on
 y
ea
r *
 fi
rs
t s
em
es
te
r c
ol
le
ge
 c
la
ss
 g
ro
up
 *
 d
eg
re
e.
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